Sorcha McCormack
Vulnerability and Sexual Assault Law: The Inadequacy of the Autonomy-based Approach was published by Routledge in July 2026.
What is the book about?
This book critiques the legal (and social) response to victim/survivors of rape and sexual assault. It does so by using insights from vulnerability theories (including Martha Fineman & Erin Gilson) in unique ways. Firstly, I dismantle the liberal legal autonomous subject, who responsibilises (rather than empowers) victim/survivors which then inevitably leads to an excessive focus on their behaviour and victim blame. I suggest legal reforms based on a more nuanced understanding of our existence. I explore previously suggested reforms and identify why they are limited by the underpinning theoretical foundations, then ultimately suggest reforms underpinned by an understanding of vulnerability, that encourage more of a focus on a defendant and their (reasonable) belief in consent. In essence, the aim of this book is to inspire the reader to question and rethink everything they know and accept about the legal and societal response to rape and sexual violence, to posit difficult questions, and to open the conversation more broadly to allow new ideas for reform.
Why did I write it?
This book was borne out of my PhD which was completed in 2020 at Durham University. I am passionate about tackling violence against women and girls- in particular, I am passionate about challenging the stereotypical scripts and myths that surround sexual encounters, the responsibilisation and blame of women, and the failings of the law to hold defendants accountable. Most suggested reforms tinker within the current perceived boundaries of the legislation. I strongly believe that unless we begin to discuss difficult topics through a different lens, we may never achieve pragmatic and systemic change.
What does it add to the field, and what work still needs to be done?
I call for reform that places more of a focus on the defendant, his actions, his belief, and his responsibilities. In particular, I argue the ‘reasonableness’ of a defendant’s belief in consent is largely overlooked. In determining its reasonableness, the steps taken to ascertain a belief in consent can be considered (and all other circumstances). However, there is no requirement to take steps to ascertain or demonstrate how reasonable that belief is. In other words, if a defendant does take steps to ascertain consent, that’s great and it will work in their favour; if they don’t, it doesn’t really matter and it won’t be held against them. The Gillen Review of Northern Ireland identified this as an issue and suggested that a jury should take heed of a defendant’s failure to take steps- which I also endorse. However, I have taken it further, and suggested that there are certain circumstances, where a defendant would know (or ought to know) that the victim was experiencing their vulnerability so much so at that time that they ought to have taken additional steps to ensure they respected their autonomy and acted reasonably. I do give a (non-exhaustive) list of those circumstances, including relationships which are inherently power imbalanced i.e. employer and employee. I also give examples of what could amount to steps taken. Most literature focuses on reimaging consent (which I engage with too) but I suggest focusing on reforming a defendant ‘s reasonable belief in consent might encourage that shift we are looking for.
From my critical analysis of the theoretical framework of the legislation, I have also identified that the way in which the harm of rape is framed and responded too is also inadequate- this is my next project.
It must be acknowledged though, that law reform alone can only do so much. Whilst this book sets out a roadmap for legal change, the next steps must also confront the cultural, institutional, and structural barriers that continue to deny victim/survivors justice.